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the exports of 
developing 
countries 
Gary P. Sampson* 
It is an undeniable fact that in recent years protec-
tionism has increased in the developed countries, 
with all its harmful consequences for international 
trade and the development of the periphery. 
Since this is an established fact, it appears to be 
worthwhile studying the arguments used by the 
centres to justify it, and the means by which they put 
it into practice. In dealing with the first of these 
points the author concentrates on two "pressures" 
towards protection: the desire to attain balance-of-
payments equilibrium, and arguments that imports 
from the peripheral countries "disrupt" factor and 
product markets in the centres; and he demonstrates, 
with a wealth of illustration, that these arguments are 
not very convincing. 
In this treatment of the second point —the 
nature of protection— he presents in orderly fashion 
the various instruments currently used to establish 
protection. H e analyses the quantitative restrictions, 
such as the so-called voluntary measures, orderly 
marketing arrangements and organized free trade, as 
well as the qualitative ones, including price limits 
and governments subsidies to enterprises hurt by 
imports. 
In the face of this bleak picture, the author 
suggests a number of measures which would help to 
redirect this "neomercantilist" tendency in the 
centres and alleviate its effects on the periphery. He 
is aware, however, that it is not easy to arrive at 
solutions since, in the last analysis, everything 
depends on the prevailing power relations in inter-
national trade. 
•Staff member of UNCTAD (Geneva), Helpli.] 
comments from Professor Richard Snupc ¡tnd Doctor 
Andrew Cornfbrd are gratefully acknowledged. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the author and not the 
United Nations. 
Contemporary protectionism 
and exports of developing 
countries 
For some time there has been a growing 
concern over the return to protectionism. This 
prompted Johnson to base his 1973 Presiden-
tial Address to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science on the "New 
Mercantilism".1 Last year the General Agree-
ment on Tariff's and Trade (GATT) found it 
necessary to restate the case for maintaining an 
open economy in times of recession,2 while the 
McCracken Report,3 after attributing much of 
the post-war growth in OECD countries to an 
"open multilateral system for international 
trade and payments" warns of the "danger that 
the edifice of free trade, so carefully built, may 
begin to disintegrate".4 For developing 
countries, the importance of market access for 
their exports to developed countries has long 
been recognized, and has recently received 
new support from several empirical studies.5 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to establish 
that there is a growing incidence of protection 
in developed market economies. Recent 
protection is perhaps even more difficult to 
"measure" than it has been in the past,6 but 
opinions have been formed as to its impor-
tance. In forming these opinions the impor-
tance of new barriers to imports from devel-
oping countries is frequently played down, as it 
is argued that it principally affects the "star 
performers" who are doing very well anyway. 
1 H . G. Johnson, "Mercantilism: Past, Present and 
Future" , in H. G. Johnson (éd.), The New Mercantilism, 
New York, St. Martins Press, 1973. 
2 GATT, Trade Liberalization, Protectionism and 
Interdependence, R. Blackhurst, N. Marian and J. Tumlir, 
Geneva, 1977. 
3 O E C D , Towards full employment and price stability, 
(The McCracken Report), Paris, 1977. 
4lbid.,p. 11. 
5 For a discussion oí the results of theses studies, see 
A. Krueger, "Effects of exports from new industrial coun-
tries on U.S. industries", in W. Kasper and T. G. Perry 
(eds.), Growth, Trade and Structural Change in an 
Open Australian Economy, Centre for Applied Economic 
Research. University of New South Wales, 1978; and B. 
Balassa, "Exports Incentives and Export Performance 
in Developing Countries; A Comparative Analysis", World 
Bank, mimeo., 1977. 
'•Many of the difficulties relate to the nature of 
recent protectionist measures imposed. This will be 
re turned to at a later stage in the paper. 
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Eight developing countries accounted for 
78% of the increment in developing country 
manufactured exports to developed market 
economies between 1970 and 1976. As far as 
pressures for increased protection are con-
cerned, a great deal of importance is frequently 
attached to the low level of economic activity in 
industrialized countries and the concomitant 
excess capacity of labour and capital as factors 
of production.7 The implication, whether 
explicit or implicit, is that higher growth rates 
would be coupled with both less forceful 
demands for protection and less willingness on 
the part of national authorities to succumb to 
these pressures. 
While one should avoid "crying wolf" at 
any increase in protection, particularly in times 
of economic slack, it seems there are legitimate 
grounds for concern on the part of developing 
countries and sound reasons for considering 
the above views on recent trade restrictions to 
be unduly optimistic. Such views frequently 
ignore the existing state of protection to which 
the n e w obstacles to trade should be added, 
narrowly define protection as restrictions on 
imports and neglect the problems associated 
with removing any trade obstacles once they are 
mounted. Similarly, little attention appears to 
b e paid to the type of protectionist measures 
be ing resorted to in recent years.8 Tariffs are 
now unpopular and preference is given to non-
tariff* barriers which have a long and unsuc-
cessful history in multilateral trade negotia-
tions directed to reducing trade barriers. 
As lar as the level of economic activity in 
industrialized countries is concerned, it is also 
possible to assign to it an important, but not 
dominant, role in the recent increase in protec-
tion. Growing rigidities in tactor markets of the 
O E C D countries have been lamented, and 
there appears to be greater unwillingness on 
the part of O E C D governments to give up some 
chosen share of the domestic market of an 
7 0 . Long "The Protectionist Threat to World Trade 
Relations", Inter Economics, November-December 1977, 
for example, points to the role of the recession in increasing 
demands for protection and the role of protection in 
prolonging the recession. 
8
 A notable exception is the comprehensive discussion 
to be found in UNCTAD, Growing Protectionism and the 
Standstill on Trade Barriers Against Imports from Devel-
oping Countries, TD/B/C.2/194, Geneva, 1978. 
increasing number of non-strategic industries.9 
If this is so, a more dramatic (but legitimate) 
interpretation of what is taking place today 
would consider recent changes in commercial 
policy to be the tip of an iceberg. What is at 
stake is access to the markets of the eighties. 
The problem is in reality nothing less than 
deciding who will produce what in the future 
with all its associated ramifications, and 
import controls are only one of a multitude of 
policy tools being drawn on to implement the 
decisions. Viewed in this context, the fact that 
only the "star performing" developing 
countries are affected by recent changes in 
commercial policy is a measure of the impor-
tance of the recent protectionist policies and 
not the contrary. If just a handful of developing 
countries can be the source of considerable 
market disruption, what does the future hold as 
more developing countries reach some sort of 
industrial maturity. 
If one views recent developments in com-
mercial and other domestic policies against the 
backdrop of existing protection, its importance 
lies in its closing off many areas which hitherto 
received relatively liberal treatment in inter-
national trade. This is particularly important for 
developing countries. Certain areas where they 
have long held a clear comparative advantage 
have been tightly controlled, as major import-
ing industrial countries sought time to struc-
turally adjust their threatened sectors. 
Agricultural markets in food-importing de-
veloped countries have always been closely reg-
ulated and there has only been limited market 
access for developing country products.10 While 
only last year tariff's on non-competing tropical 
products were partially reduced, these conces-
sions are currently withheld by the U.S. until 
9 O E C D , Textile Industry in OECD Countries, Paris, 
1977. 
' "For a discussion of trade barriers facing developing 
country agricultural exports to Sweden, see G. P. Sampson 
and A. J. Yeats, "Do Import Levies Matter: The Case of 
Sweden" , Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, IU. ( 
Vol. 84, N.° 4, part 1, 1976, and for imports of food and 
agricultural products under the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), see Sampson and Yeats (1977). 
See G. P. Sampson and A, J. Yeats, "An Evaluation of 
the Common Agricultural Policy as a Barrier Facing 
Agricultural Exports to the European Economic Communi-
ty", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Mena-
sha, Wise. Vol. 59, N.° 1, February 1972. 
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reciprocity is received.11 Such trade barriers 
have frequently been imposed due to the 
special structural problems facing the agricul-
tural sector.12 Similarly, exports of cotton 
textiles and clothing have been restricted since 
1962, because, as with agriculture, developed 
market economies sought time to structurally 
adjust these sectors of production.13 The 
voluntary export restraints which emerged in 
the late fifties and early sixties were institu-
tionalized in the LTA. This "temporary" agree-
ment adopted a broader commodity coverage 
and tighter controls under the Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA) in 1973.14 Given the 
importance of exports of agricultural products, 
textiles and clothing to developing countries, 
arrangements such as CAP and the LTA have 
long been a source of grievance. 
Always implicit, however, was the belief 
that developing countries should concentrate 
their efforts on producing those manufactured 
goods for export where developed market 
economies did not face the same structural 
problems.1 5 However, new restraints are now 
found on many manufactured goods which 
previously received liberal treatment in inter-
national trade. Manufactured goods exported 
by developing countries and subject to new 
quantitative restrictions include non-cotton 
textiles and clothing, footwear, electronics, 
mechanical and engineering goods. These 
sectors currently face structural problems in 
many developed market economies, as do steel 
products and shipbuilding-areas of some 
U T . Ibrahim, "Developing Countries and the Tokyo 
Round", Journal of World Trade Law, London, Vol. 12, 
N.° 1, January-February, 1978. 
1 2 The European Economic Community (EEC), for 
example, adopted the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
in 1962 to gain the time necessary to structurally reorganize 
the agricultural sector; to raise productivity and increase 
international competitiveness. Nevertheless, the ad va-
lorem incidence of variable levies on grain imports are 
currently at an all t ime high. 
1 3 The U.S., for example, has since 1962 negotiated 
voluntary export restraints under the Long Term Arrange-
men t Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles 
(LTA) to gain temporary relief and to facilitate the shifting 
of labour and capital to more internationally competitive 
areas of the economy. 
1 4 The E E C has recently broken with the MFA to 
unilaterally impose stricter measures, and some countries 
are now being faced with quota reductions. 
15A clear statement of the mood of the late sixties as to 
current importance and considerable future 
importance for developing countries. 
As the continuation of the LTA and other 
domestic support schemes through the sixties 
indicates, even in times of economic buoyancy 
it is difficult to change the structure of produc-
tion. Labour and capital resist changes that are 
necessary to ensure that they are efficiently 
employed in areas of the economy where they 
are internationally competitive. In periods 
characterized by anything less than economic 
buoyancy, it appears that structural change is 
almost impossible. The important question to 
address, however, is how much of the recent 
protection is due to low levels of aggregate 
demand, and how much is due to growing 
rigidities and distortions in factor markets and a 
political desire to maintain internationally 
uncompetitive industries regardless of 
economic costs. The paucity of positive 
structural adjustment programmes in many 
developed countries and the proliferation of 
domestic support schemes seems to point to a 
lack of political will to change the structure of 
production. 
Thus, in summary, for structural adjust-
ment to take place it appears necessary to have 
more than a favourable economic climate. The 
true motive behind the protection is of crucial 
importance, for mercantilist protection 
requested as temporary assistance to adjust 
structurally has a history of becoming rapidly 
institutionalized and permanent. Competing 
with domestic developed country producers 
and other developed country exporters on 
anything other than economic grounds holds 
little promise for developing countries. The 
problem which emerges for developing 
countries is how to select those products to 
develop for export. Uncertainty now surrounds 
future market access, and uncertainty is 
perhaps the most effective non-tariff barrier to 
trade.16 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate 
the advantages of outward-looking export orientated 
growth strategies for developing countries can be found in 
D. B. Keesing, "Outward Looking Policies and Economic 
Development" , Economic Journal, London, June 1967. 
i 6 T h e role of uncertainty in distorting trade flows is 
discussed in GATT, Trade Liberalization..., op. cit. 
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some aspects of the new protectionism which 
may be of interest to developing countries. The 
paper focusses on the contemporary sources of 
protectionist pressure and the nature of the 
protection itself, as such an investigation 
facilitates the discussion of the principal points 
raised above. The paper closes with a con-
clusion and policy recommendations. 
I 
Pressures for protection in developed 
market economies 
In 1970, Baldwin considered fixed exchange 
rates and structural adjustment problems to be 
the major sources of protectionist pressures and 
resistance to trade liberalization: "Greater 
exchange-rate flexibility and much more 
effective adjustment assistance are the two 
most crucial needs if the major trading nations 
are to achieve a significant increase in the 
mutual benefits of international trade... 
Exchange-rate flexibility is needed not Only to 
ease balance-of-payments pressures when 
balanced cuts in trade barriers are not possible 
but, even more importantly, to prevent the 
substitution of trade distorting commercial 
policies for exchange-rate policy".17 
Today exchange rates fluctuate widely and 
despite OECD-sponsored declarations to the 
contrary, member countries still use com-
mercial policy for balance-of-payments pur-
poses. In addition, national legislation in many 
countries now provides funds for industries 
suffering from import competition, but indus-
try-specific protection is growing. 
1. Balance of payments 
The orthodox role of the exchange rate in 
macro-economic models of internal-external 
balance is to switch factors of production and 
expenditure between the traded and non-
traded goods sectors of the economy. The 
switch is brought about by a currency rea-
lignment, and the extent of the relative price 
change in the two sectors is a measure of 
success of the realignment.18 When the change 
17R. Baldwin, Non-Tariff Distortions of International 
Trade, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1970, 
pp . 17 and 18. 
18W.M. Corden, Inflation, Exchange Rates and the 
in the exchange rate is coupled with the 
appropriate absorption-changing policy, inter-
nal and external balance can be secured-
commercial policy is not needed to ensure 
external balance. 
Recent developments in the literature 
provide numerous explanations of why 
fluctuating exchange rates do not live up to 
their expectations, and nothing more than a 
cursory discussion is varranted here. 
Consider a country which is a price taker 
on world markets facing a balance-of-trade 
deficit and internal balance.19 The appropriate 
policy then would be to devalue and reduce 
absorption. However, the devaluation may not 
lead to the relative price change of tradeable 
and non-tradeable goods. There may, for exam-
ple, be real wage resistance to the devaluation-
induced price increase and the resulting fall in 
real wages.20 If the reduced absorption is to be 
secured by a tax increase on wage earners, for 
example, attempts to force a return of the direct 
payment of the post-tax real wage to the 
original level may negate the absorption 
reduction policy. 
Also, as Corden has pointed out, there may 
World Economy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977; and 
R. Dornbush, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange Rate 
Regime and Macro-economic Policy", in Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Stockholm, Vol. 78, No. 2,1976. 
19Capital flows are ignored, bu t the analysis that 
follows would not be gready changed with their inclusion 
(see Corden, op. cit., p . 42). It is also assumed that the 
partial equilibrium price elasticities for the demand and 
supply for imports and exports are such tíiat one would 
expect an improvement in the balance of trade following a 
devaluation. 
^ S e e R. H. Snape, "The Impact oflnflationary Reces-
sion in Developed Countries on the Developing World", 
UNCTAD, mimeo., Geneva, 1978. 
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even be increased pressures for protection.21 If 
the real wages claimed by wage earners are 
above the marginal product at full employ-
ment, this is inconsistent with internal balance. 
To meet such real wage claims requires a redis-
tribution of income —a redistribution which 
can be achieved through quotas or other com-
mercial policy. If the import-competing sector 
is labour intensive and the export sector capital 
intensive, protection of imports would achieve 
a price effect similar to that of a (successful) 
devaluation, but also a redistribution of in-
comes from profits to wages. The latter effect 
would not result from a devaluation. 
The foregoing analysis assumes that 
switching is appropriate as some structural 
change is necessary. It can be argued that 
exchange-rate changes may be monetary 
phenomena that do not indicate real changes 
in a country's competitive position. A currency 
realignment will not remove the source of 
imbalance in the balance of payments if im-
balance is due to an excess domestic demand 
for money over the receipts of foreign money 
—an excess that can only persist if supported 
by domestic monetary policy. For these and 
other reasons, fluctuating exchange rates may 
not secure external balance and do not remove 
the need for commercial policy for balance-of-
payments purposes. 
Thus, twenty-four countries were applying 
import surcharges and sixteen had import 
deposit schemes in effect for at least part of the 
period 1970-1974. All were member countries 
of GATT operating outside of the appropriate 
regulation (Article XII) in which any measure 
other than a quota is outlawed as a control 
device to regulate balance of payments.22 
Indeed, in view of the above discussion, 
it is not secret why import deposit schemes, 
for example, are so attractive. Under such a 
scheme, an importer is required to lodge a 
certain percentage of the value of the import in 
a frozen account at the reserve bank. This 
21W.M. Corden, Inflation, Exchange rates..., op. cit., 
p. 31. 
22See F.C. Bergsten, "Reforming the GATT: The Use 
of Trade Measures for Balance of Payments Purposes", 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, Febru-
ary. 1977. 
makes importing less attractive (and indeed 
imports more expensive), and if there is not a 
complementary increase in the money supply, 
there is a reduction in absorption following 
the blocking of funds with the central bank. 
The joint objectives of lower imports coupled 
with reduced absorption are thus assured with-
out direct market price changes and direct 
monetary and fiscal action. 
The use of commercial policy for balance-
of-payments purposes, however, does not 
appear to be a source of protection likely to 
cause particular concern for developing coun-
tries. It appears to be restricted to small 
countries which act unilaterally and in a non-
discriminatory fashion by invoking measures 
which are essentially temporary in nature.23 
What is perhaps useful to speculate on, how-
ever, is the possibility that fluctuating rates in 
fact are the source of some demands for in-
creased protection for non-balance-of-pay-
ments reasons. 
In discussing an argument which he at-
tributes to Mundell and Laffer, Corden points 
to the fact that a floating exchange rate may lead 
to rate fluctuation induced by capital move-
ments. Changing expectations and divergent 
interest-rate policies cause portfolio prefer-
ences of asset holders to switch between 
important currencies.24 
For these and other reasons, small coun-
tries see the value of their own currency 
fluctuating against that of their major trading 
partners. Thus, governments intervene to bring 
some sort of stability into their effective ex-
change rate. Over the period September 1974 
to July 1976, the Australian government inter-
vened to maintain a constant effective ex-
change rate. Over the same period, however, 
there were large differences in country-spe-
cific exchange rates. The U.K. and New Zealand 
are both important trading partners for Aus-
tralia, and both these currencies devalued 24 
^While developing countries are major offenders in 
using commercial policy for balance-of-payments pur-
poses, Bergten, in calling for a major revision of Article 
XII, has argued convincingly that developing countries do 
in certain circumstances have the right to use commercial 
policy for this purpose. See "Reforming the GATT...", 
loe. cit. 
^W.M. Corden, Inflation, Exchange Rates..., op. cit. 
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per cent against the Australian dollar over the 
period. To the extent that import agents refrain 
from taking a windfall gain and do, in fact, pass 
on the currency change in lower prices, fluc-
tuating exchange rates do provide a source of 
"industry disruption" protectionist pressure.25 
As far as foreign currency revaluations are 
concerned, however, there is unlikely to be 
any symmetry in demands for reduced protec-
tion, as consumer interests are notoriously 
diffuse and domestic producers of importables 
have the option of increasing prices or expand-
ing their domestic market share. 
2. Market disruption 
Of considerable concern to developing coun-
tries, particularly the emerging producers of 
manufactured goods, is the protection that is 
granted in response to claims that the imports 
from these countries are disrupting domestic 
markets. For exporters there are two important 
considerations that should be noted. While 
safeguard action is both necessary and appro-
priate in many circumstances, there should be 
some guarantee that this safeguard action is 
temporary and takes into due consideration the 
disruption in the exporting market that follows 
the imposition of the protectionist measure. 
Secondly, it should be clear that it is in fact the 
imports from the developing country that are 
responsible for the market disruption. Before 
discussing these considerations in some detail, 
it is necessary to have a clear idea of how 
markets are disrupted. 
Presumably the only market disruption 
that concerns the authorities in the importing 
country is that which occurs in the factor 
markets. Importing cheaper (non-strategic) 
products may not be a problem in itself, but if 
it results in unemployed labour and capital 
^ W i t h i n tills context it is interestingto note exceptions 
such as the extent of protection granted to U.S. industries 
compet ing with Japanese goods. In April (1978) the 
President imposed a 21 per cent tariff on imported citizen 
band radios comming from Japan and negotiations are 
underway to secure voluntary export restraints from 
Japanese car exporters. Due to the revaluation of the yen, 
Toyota increased its prices in April for the third time in 
six months bringing the total average price increase for 
its products over this period to 21 per cent. (Financial 
Times, April 18.) 
there is cause for concern. Within this context 
it is important to draw the distinction between 
over-capacity in capital and redundancies of 
labour that result from the low level of eco-
nomic activity, and those that result from 
structural changes of a more micro nature. In 
the first case, the role of protection is clear 
—there is a bolstering of the domestically 
produced share of importables at the expense 
of the foreign suppliers. The domestic prob-
lems associated with insufficient demand are 
exported to the foreign supplier. Pressures are 
then felt on "third markets" as alternative 
outlets are sought. 
The second case is less clear as there are 
many sources of structural change in both 
product and factor markets. 
(a) Factor market disruption 
— Factors may become unemployed if, 
with an unchanged production function, long-
term relative price changes lead to factor 
substitution. Real wages moving ahead of 
labour productivity may result in substitution 
away from marginal workers and an increase in 
the capital-labour ratio. Labour will remain 
unemployed until real wage claims and mar-
ginal products move closer into line, or new 
investment results in job openings where real 
wage claims are warranted.26 
— There may be technical change which 
shifts the production function neutrally and 
bears equally on all factors needing less inputs 
for a given output. Factors remain unemployed 
until the level of output (demand) increases. 
— Biased technical change may lead to 
changing factor proportions (substitution) with 
a given factor-price ratio. As with the preceding 
case, an increase in output (demand) is neces-
sary to return to full employment. 
b) Product market disruption 
— Factor markets may be disrupted due 
to changes in the product market. 
— The pattern of demand may change due 
to a change in tastes, indirect taxes, etc. 
— A product may come on the market 
^ S e e R. H. Snape, "The Import of Inflationary Reces-
sion.,.", op. cit. 
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which is more competitive in price. This may 
be supplied by domestic producers, foreign 
developed-country exporters or developing-
country exporters. 
The interesting feature which emerges is 
that the only role developing countries can 
play in disrupting domestic markets is indi-
rectly through the product market as one of the 
suppliers of more competitively priced goods. 
Even here their role may be secondary, since 
their comparative advantage may improve due 
to a relative improvement in their own cost 
structure, or a worsening in the cost structure 
in the importing country. What is important is 
that before protection is implemented, the true 
source of market disruption should be identi-
fied. I t has been suggested that imports from 
developing countries are frequently used as 
"scapegoats" for internal structural prob-
lems.27 Similarly, for a variety of sociological 
reasons, government officials feel comfortable 
in protecting domestic labour and capital from 
"cheap imports from developing countries".28 
The extent to which developing countries 
are a source of market disruption is an empir-
ical question. Krueger has found that import 
growth has not been a significant factor affect-
ing the growth of output and employment from 
1960-1975 in the U.S.2t> Cable has arrived at 
similar conclusions for the U.K.30 He estimated 
that jobs lost in the U.K. footwear industry 
dur ing 1970-1975 due to net import penetration 
amounted to only 0.4 per cent of employment, 
and in the clothing industry, where the loss of 
jobs was highest, the loss was 1.7 per cent of 
total employment. In fact, in no labour-inten-
sive sector, except men's shirts and suits, did 
output suffer from import growth. A recent 
study for Germany has revealed that if there 
were increased penetration by manufactured 
imports from developing countries, the as-
sociated growth in exports to developing 
countries would mean that there would be no 
ne t loss of jobs.31 
2 7A. Krueger, "Effects of Exports...", op. cit. 
2 8V. Cable, "British Protectionism and LDC Imports" 
in Overseas Development Institute Review, N.° 2,1977. 
2 9A. Krueger, "Effects of Exports...", op. cit. 
3 0V. Cable, "British Protectionism...", loc. cit. 
3 1 UNCTAD, "Growing Protectionism...", op. cit. 
Interesting data on the penetration of the 
exports of developing countries in developed 
country markets can be found in the UNCTAD 
Handbook of International Trade and Devel-
opment Statistics (table 7.1). Developing 
country imports are expressed as a share of total 
apparent consumption in major developed 
country markets and the data are reported for 
14 major product groups in the E E C (6), U.K., 
Japan and the U.S. over the period 1959-1960 to 
1975. If agriculture, fuels, mining and clothing 
are excluded, developing-country imports 
comprise considerably less than 6.5 per cent of 
apparent consumption for all product groups, 
all countries and all years. While there is a 
tendency for the share of developing-country 
imports in domestic apparent consumption of 
the group of countries as a whole to increase 
over the period (from 3.3 per cent to 6.2 per 
cent), this increase is largely due to the in-
crease in fuels and other primary products 
(11.6 per cent to 24 per cent). Where disruption 
may be expected to follow increased market 
penetration is in the manufactured goods 
sector. Here, imports as a share of domestic 
consumption increased from 1.2 per cent to a 
meager 2.0 per cent over the fifteen year 
period. 
Within the manufacturing sector of devel-
oped countries it appears that one of the areas 
where disruption has been most severe is the 
clothing and textiles sector. As exports of 
clothing and textiles from developing countries 
have long been controlled under multilateral 
agreements, and have recently been the object 
of new and more restrictive measures, a close 
look at some relevant statistics appears to be 
warranted. 
The total imports of textiles by developed 
market economies grew from 11 to 19 billion 
dollars be tween 1972 and 1976. Imports of 
clothing grew from 7.5 to 15.5 billion dollars 
over the same period. In 1976, only 13 per cent 
of the imports of textiles were supplied by 
developing countries and 39 per cent of 
clothing imports. Developing countries did 
not secure an increased share of the increased 
value of trade in textiles over this period, and 
in clothing only raised their share of the 
increased trade value by 16 per cent. Devel-
oped countries were the source of over 75 per 
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cent of the increased imports of textiles into 
developed countries between 1975 and 1976 
and 40 per cent of the increase in clothing 
imports. Developed countries, however, are 
not subject to controls under the new MFA. 
For the U.S. over the period 1972 to 1976, 
total exports of textiles grew more rapidly than 
imports of textiles from developing countries, 
while total clothing exports and clothing im-
ports from developing countries grew at the 
same rate. Of some additional interest is the 
fact that developing countries are net importers 
of the intermediate goods and raw materials for 
the manufacture of clothing and other textile 
goods. In 1975, the U.S. had a one-billion-
dollar trade surplus with developing countries 
in textile fibres (SITC 26) plus textile machines 
(SITC 717). 
As far as the domestic market shares are 
concerned, the UNCTAD Handbook reveals 
that in the United States, for example, imports 
of textiles from developing countries ac-
counted for less than 2.5 per cent of apparent 
domestic consumption in 1975 and less than 
10 per cent of consumption of clothing in the 
same year. In the U.K., for example, where 
import penetration in clothing is the highest 
(13 per cent in 1975), it is interesting to note 
that exports were 18.7 per cent of apparent 
consumption in the same year. 
While it is difficult to accept that textiles 
and clothing imports from developing coun-
tries warrant the severe treatment that has 
recently been imposed under the MFA (1974 
and 1976), one cannot deny the often repeated 
claims that textile and clothing markets in 
OECD countries are "disrupted". Clearly of 
importance is the penetration of markets clas-
sified at a more disaggregated level. The EEC, 
for example, has frequently referred to unem-
ployment created by cheap imports of sensitive 
products from developing countries. Textile 
and clothing products have been classified 
accordingly —the sensitive products fre-
quently being labour-intensive clothing. 
Within the context of the earlier discus-
sion, however, it is interesting to note if other 
sources of market disruption are present. While 
this is a subject for a lengthy and detailed 
empirical investigation, suffice it to point to the 
fact that in recent years there has been massive 
investment in labour-intensive clothing 
production in the EEC and OECD countries 
generally. The result has been enormous 
increases in labour productivity in clothing 
manufacture. The figures below for all apparel 
excluding footwear, are aggregative but illus-
trative. 
CHANGES IN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
OF CLOTHING MANUFACTURE 
1970 TO 1975 




United Kingdom 144.4 
United States 123.3 
Source: Percentages calculated from output and employ-
ment data in O E C D (1977), Textile Industry in 
OECD Countries, Paris. 
In the U.K., for example, a failure to 
increase output of clothing over the period 
1970-1975 would result in unemployment of 40 
per cent of the work-force. As outíined above, 
labour productivity increases may be due to 
technical change or a substitution away from 
labour following real wage increases. What is 
sure is that it is not due to imports from devel-
oping countries.32 
Re-employment of labour means locating 
displaced workers in other industries, or ex-
panding the market —more can be exported, 
domestic consumption can be increased or 
imports can be reduced. The EEC appears to 
be favouring the final alternative to the detri-
ment of developing countries. .Current nego-
tiations on clothing are outside the MFA and 
thus the GATT framework, the result being that 
new restraints on developing-country exports 
involve a reduction in previously established 
quotas.33 
3 2Where the imports of developing countries may play 
a role is by forcing modernization, etc., of existing equip-
ment through supplying competitive products. 
Quota reductions for exports from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea to the EEC are reported in the 
Financial Times, 6 January 1978. 
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Given data such as these, it is reasonable to 
ascribe an alternative role to the MFA — quite 
different to the spirit in which it was signed. 
Instead of looking for a breathing space to 
phase out internationally uncompetitive prod-
ucts, the MFA may be used to secure time to 
increase productivity in the domestic industry 
and achieve international competitiveness. 
If this is not achieved, the vested interests of 
the "interest groups" are strengthened and 
protection is institutionalized. 
In this respect the role of the government 
in recent years has been an interesting one. 
There is an increasing unwillingness of gov-
ernments to allow the decline of uncompetitive 
industries. While there is a role for govern-
ments in devising positive structural adjust-
ment schemes, protection coupled with do-
mestic subsidies is more frequently the rule of 
the game. Thus in France there has been 
massive support schemes for the outdated 
Boussac textile empire through deferred social 
security payments, subsidized loans, etc. 
Similarly, the Temporary Employment Sub-
sidy subsidizes salaries for 250,000 workers in 
the U.K., most of which are located in the 
clothing, textiles and footwear industries. 
II 
Nature of protection 
The characteristic which is common to almost 
all the recent increases in protection in devel-
oped economies is that they have proved 
virtually impossible to negotiate away within 
the existing institutional framework estab-
lished for multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTNs). Indeed, this may be one of the 
important explanations of the changing nature 
of protection, for in an increasingly inter-
dependent world, governments take measures 
to achieve the autonomy they feel they are 
losing in areas such as international trade.34 
In successive rounds of MTNs conducted 
under the auspices of GATT, considerable 
success has been achieved in reducing most 
favoured nation (MFN) tariff rates. There are 
at least three reasons why tariffs are good 
material for multilateral negotiations. Firstly, 
the data are recorded in national schedules 
and freely available to all. Secondly, their ad 
valorem incidence is known (or can be calcu-
lated) so they can be compared with other 
country tariffs, fed into tariff cutting formulae, 
etc. Finally, governments appear willing to 
reduce tariffs. There are numerous reasons 
^R.N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: 
Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community, McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1968. A. Lindbeck ( 1977), "Economic 
Dependence and Interdependence in the Industrialized 
World", Seminar Paper N.° 83, Stockholm, Institute for 
International Economic Studies, June 1977. 
why this is so. A cynical approach is to suggest 
that tariffs are blunt instruments, slow to act 
with an uncertain outcome.35 
There are innumerable ways in which 
trade flows can be distorted.36 It is not the 
purpose of this section of the paper to discuss 
trade distortions as such, but rather to attempt 
to discern if there is a trend in the use of 
contemporary protectionist devices.37 It would 
appear that there is. Firstly, there is a "harden-
ing" in commercial policy that comes with a 
move away from tariffs to direct price and 
quantity controls. Voluntary export restraints 
are just country-specific quotas and minimum 
import prices (with penalty duties) are sliding-
scale tariffs. Quotas certainly have a long 
history, and sliding-scale tariffs date at least 
from the Corn Laws. Secondly, there would 
appear to be increasing government involve-
^Ohlin G. (1968), "Trade in a Non-Laissez Faire 
World", (n P. Samuelson (ed.) International Economic 
Relations, Macmillan, London. H.G. Johnson, "Mercan-
tilism: Past, Present, Future", op..cit. 
^For a definition of terms such as trade distortion and 
non-tariff barrier to trade, see R. Baldwin, Non-Tariff 
Distortions of International Trade, Washington D.C., The 
Brookings Institution, 1970. For a comprehensive classifi-
cation of trade distorting devices, see A. J. Yeats, Trade 
Barriers facing Developing Countries, MacMillan. At 
3
'Any detailed discussion of recent changes in com-
mercial policy is extremely tedious. A large proportion of 
trade restraints are bilaterally negotiated so the list is 
long. 
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meait which directly affects the working of the 
market. More responsibility appears to be 
taken by governments in deciding which 
industries should flourish or survive and a wide 
variety of industries now appear to be consid-
ered by governments to be in their realm of 
responsibility. 
1. Quantitative restrictions 
Broadly speaking, recent quantitative restric-
tions are bilaterally negotiated by GATT 
member countries without passing through 
the appropriate GATT channels.38 With some 
exceptions, quantitative restrictions are out-
lawed by GATT (Article XI) and country-
specific non-MFN treatment runs contrary to 
the whole GATT philosophy (Article I). 
New quantitative restrictions frequently 
carry the title of "voluntary export restraints", 
"orderly marketing arrangements" or "orga-
nized free trade", but are simply quotas agreed 
to under the threat of more restrictive action. 
Normally they are "safeguard action" in the 
face of the threat of market disruption. GATT 
is bypassed because the appropriate safeguard 
article of the Agreement (Article XIX) is con-
sidered too restrictive by many member coun-
tries, and a softer interpretation of the threat 
of market disruption is frequently found in 
national legislations.39 Furthermore, safeguard 
action within GATT has to be applied uni-
formly to all member countries, but it appears 
that country-specific treatment is preferred. 
Finally, such safeguard action has to be 
temporary and the duration of the restriction 
is monitored by GATT. 
Quotas have proved extremely difficult to 
3 8 There are of course exceptions, and details of 
recourse to Article XIX, etc., can be found in various issues 
of GATT Activities. It should be added however that 
movement outside of the GATT Articles is not new and 
historically, selected products and countries have been 
excused. There have always been quantitative restrictions 
on agricultural imports to the EEC. In fact, the formation of 
t h e E E C itself was contrary to GATT rules. Similarly, non-
MFN quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing have 
been imposed by developed countries and formalized with 
GATT under the LTA. 
3 9J. N. Bhagwati, "Market Disruption, Export Market 
Disruption, Compensation and GATT Reform", World 
Development, Oxford, Vol. 4, December 1976. 
negotiate away in GATT. Perhaps this is due 
to the fact that they have, in recent years, 
been traditionally applied to agricultural pro-
ducts —an area where GATT has achieved 
few positive results. This may be due to the 
nature of the restriction itself and the difficul-
ties of trading concessions in negotiations, or 
perhaps because quotas are frequently impos-
ed as safeguard action. Even more important 
for future negotiations, however, is the fact 
that a comprehensive file of recent restrictions 
does not exist. Many are not recorded by GATT 
and in some instances not even by national 
authorities in the importing country.40 
Also of importance is the fact that many 
recently negotiated export restraints only 
involve varying degrees of government in-
volvement. They are briefly discussed 
below.41 
(a) Voluntary export restraints 
Voluntary export restraints may be bilat-
erally negotiated between industries in import-
ing and exporting countries with minimum 
government support. Implementation is left 
to the industry in the exporting country. There 
may also be government-to-government 
intervention, but again with the implementa-
tion left to agreement among the exporters in 
the exporting country. Then, there are volun-
tary export restraints negotiated under the 
umbrella of intergovernmental bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, and which involve 
direct action by the government in the export-
ing country to regulate quantities and/or prices 
of the exports concerned.42 
4 0 I n the U.S., for example, voluntary export restraints 
are not recorded in the Federal Registry as they are 
considered a trade restriction imposed by the trading 
partner. See T. Murray, W. Schmidt and I. Walter (1978), 
"Alternative Forms of Protection Against Market Dis-
ruption", mimeo, 1978. 
4 1 For a comprehensive discussion of these protection-
ist devices, see UNCTAD, "Growing Protectionism...", op. 
cit. 
4 2Export restraint by Japanese motor vehicle exporters 
to the U.K. is an example of a restraint resulting from inter-
company consultations, while Korean footwear exports to 
the U.S. were restrained as the result of intergovernmental 
consultations. 
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(b) Orderly marketing arrangements 
As already indicated, the extent of govern-
ment involvement in "voluntary" export 
restraints varies. In the case of orderly market-
ing arrangements, government intervention is 
explicit and formal, with specific agreements 
being negotiated between exporting and 
importing countries. Under such agreements, 
the exporting country agrees to restrict to 
specified levels exports which are causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury to the 
importing country's industry.43 
(c) Organized free trade 
The concept of organized free trade is 
gaining in popularity, but there is no clear 
statement of what this seemingly contradictory 
group of words means. However, some of its 
main features are already evident. Organized 
free trade would envisage market-sharing 
arrangements at the sectoral level under a 
global umbrella which would limit to specified 
levels imports of competitive foreign goods. 
The organized free trade concept implies 
essentially "orderly marketing arrangements" 
on a global scale and its adoption would thus 
amount to an institutionalization of the com-
mercial policy device described and would 
confer on it the status of an internationally 
accepted practice.44 Bilateral and multilateral 
agreements regulating trade in textiles provide 
a clear illustration of orderly marketing ar-
rangements, 
III 
Implication of new quantitative restrictions 
Tariffs are preferable to quotas for a host 
of well-known reasons.45 In view of the recent 
interest expressed in the growing interdepen-
dence of nations and the return to protection 
to gain greater control over the national eco-
nomy, one or two specific points are worthy 
of note. Quantitative restriction of the type 
described can introduce greater uncertainty 
into world trade than tariffs. Tariff rates are 
recorded in national schedules, so import 
prices are known in advance. To the extent 
that they are applied in a most-favoured-nation 
fashion, all countries face the same barriers 
and can assess their competitive position. 
Similarly, tariff changes are traditionally 
^ M a r k e t i n g arrangements, for example, are in force 
be tween the U.S. and the Republic of'Korea on certain non-
rubber footwear; the U.S. and Japan, EEC, Sweden and 
Canada on stainless and alloy tool steel; the EEC, and 
Japan and the Republic of Korea on carbon steel; the U.K. 
and the Benelux countries and Japan on television sets, 
radios and calculators (see UNCTAD, "Growing Protec-
tionism...", op. cit.). 
« I b i d . 
4 5 T h e case for tariffs in preference to quotas has 
recently been very lucidly restated by T. Murray and I. 
Walter, "Quantitative Restrictions, Developing Countries 
and GATT", Journal of World Trade Law, London, 
Vol. 11, N . ° 5 , September-October, 1977. 
negotiated in GATT so changes in competitive 
positions are common knowledge. To the 
extent that a country participates in a bilateral 
quota, price certainty is replaced by quantity 
certainty. Non-participating countries, howev-
er, have neither price nor quantity certainty, 
and the trading "rights" of competitors for the 
import market are not always common know-
ledge. Furthermore, quantitative restrictions 
in general introduce greater price instability 
into world markets than tariffs.46 While much 
has been written on the equivalence of tariffs 
and quotas, the definition of equivalance 
differs between authors. Corden47 offers the 
most rigorous requirements —a single tariff 
rate which would have the same effect as an 
import quota on the volume and value of 
imports, on the domestic and foreign price, 
and on the volume of domestic output. Under 
the appropriate assumptions one can show 
equivalence as defined in this static sense. If, 
however, the import demand or export supply 
4 6 Developing countries have expressed considerable 
concern over price uncertainty in international markets as 
is evidenced by support for the UNCTAD multi-com-
modity price stabilization schemes. 
4 7W. M. Corden, The Theory of Protection, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1971, p . 212. 
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curve shift, the impact on world price is not 
the same for the tariff and quota. Regardless 
of which curve shifts and the direction of the 
shift, the world price fluctuations are greater 
with the quota than the tariff. The extent of 
the difference depends on the elasticities of 
the curves. As countries move to isolate them-
selves from world price fluctuations by using 
quantitative controls, they exacerbate future 
world price fluctuations —presumably increas-
ing the "case" for protection.48 
Voluntary export restraints and orderly 
marketing agreements virtually force firms in 
the exporting country to form cartels. Once 
the export market is carved up, the entry of 
new firms is extremely difficult —this is 
particularly important for new firms in devel-
oping countries. Nor does future market growth 
offer hopes for new firms as some export growth 
for the exporting firms is usually a condition 
of the voluntary export restraint. Price cutting 
through greater efficiency has nothing to do 
with market access and even the rent can be 
divided up in a gentlemanly way between 
quota holders in the importing country and 
exporters. Voluntary export restraints are 
acceptable to established exporters, importers, 
import competing firms and governments 
wishing to increase autonomy without being 
bothered by GATT. It is no secret why their 
incidence is spreading.49 
Similarly, voluntary export restraints and 
orderly marketing arrangements encourage 
cartelization in the importing country. As the 
government intervenes to deal with the prob-
lems in the industry by negotiating export re-
straints on behalf of the affected firms, it has 
expanded its intervention and sometimes even 
encouraged the formation of cartels. Major 
European makers of synthetic fibres have re-
48Agricultural import quotas made possible by the use 
of a sliding scale tariff in the E E C are a classic case of a 
country isolating itself from world price fluctuations, but 
exacerbating such fluctuations, see G. P. Sampson and R. 
H. Snape, "Variable Levies, World Prices and their In-
stability", mimeo, 1978. 
4 9 I t is with considerable foresight that Shibata 
predicted the future popularity of voluntary export 
restraints for very similar reasons. See H. Shibata, "A Note 
on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 58, March 1968. 
cently announced their plants to establish a 
three-year production cartel. This move was 
initiated by the E E C Industry Commission.50 
Similarly, the Swedish government, after 
negotiating voluntary export restraints for 
Swedish steel, has now dropped its theoretical 
opposition to mergers and is offering loans and 
guarantees to sponsor the merger of three of 
Sweden's biggest special steel firms.51 
But perhaps most important for developing 
countries is that it is largely bargaining power 
which determines whether a claim for volun-
tary export restraint receives government 
approval in the importing country. Govern-
ment support depends on the political clout 
of industry leaders.52 How individual develop-
ing countries fare in securing a share of the 
import market also depends on bargaining 
power. The lack of success of developing 
countries in trade negotiations where bargain-
ing power is important (e.g., Kennedy and 
Dillon Rounds) does not auger well for their 
obtaining benefits from future trade restric-
tions of the "voluntary" type. 
1. Price restrictions 
The setting of minimum import prices has 
much in common with quantitative restric-
tions. In fact, given the domestic demand and 
supply schedules for a product, a fixed import 
price, set below the domestic market clearing 
price, establishes the quota. Such minimum 
import prices have long been applied to many 
agricultural imports into European countries 
(for example, all grains imported into the 
EEC) and more recently, steel products im-
ported into the E E C and U.S.53 
How these minimum import prices are 
administered is of some importance. For grains 
imported into the E E C , for example, an inter-
nal target price is set and a minimum import 
price (threshold price) is determined accord-
^ R e p o r t e d in Financial Times, 8 February 1978 and 
International Herald Tribune, 3 May 1978. 
5 1Reported in Economist, 11 March 1978. 
5 2J. N. Bhagwati, "Market Disruption, Export Market 
Disruption...", op. cit. 
5 3 The importance of minimum import prices for 
agricultural products has grown with the expansion of the 
E E C . 
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ingly. The minimum import price is main-
tained by a sliding scale tariff —the EEC 
isolates itself from world price fluctuations 
and holds the target price constant. The sliding 
scale tariff extracts both the rent and the 
production or export subsidy that could go to 
the producing country. The rent is frequently 
substantial as evidenced by the fact that the 
ad valorem equivalent of variable levies on 
grains imported into the EEC in July of 1977 
ranged between 88 and 161 per cent for the 
major grains. One would expect supplying 
countries to form cartels (as there are few major 
suppliers) but they do not. Protection in this 
case is rationalized on the basis of the desire 
to maintain, for social reasons, domestic inef-
ficient farming regardless of economic costs. 
The U.S. minimum import price for steel 
products, however, is rationalized as protecting 
efficient domestic producers from dumping. 
The U.S. publishes its minimum prices (trigger 
prices) and invites foreign suppliers to sell at 
this price. Sales at less than this price trigger 
a lengthy and complicated anti-dumping 
enquiry. To avoid the anti-dumping enquiry, 
suppliers sell at the minimum price. If the 
major suppliers are simply more efficient, as 
they claim (particularly Japan), this mechanism 
(unlike the sliding-scale tariff) ensures ex-
porters keep the rent. 
Minimum import prices for agricultural 
products serve to reduce exports from develop-
ing countries. Domestic production is expand-
ed in the importing country and high internal 
prices limit domestic consumption; by restric-
ting demand world prices are depressed and, 
while it may be argued that food-importing 
developing countries benefit from low world 
prices, it should be noted that this form of 
protection destabilizes world commodity 
markets (e.g., in times of over-supply the EEC 
target price does not drop accordingly). Com-
modity price stability appears to be high on 
the priority list for developing countries. 
New restrictions on steel will not affect 
most developing countries, which are at pre-
sent high-cost producers. However, imports 
from the most efficient producers in develop-
ing countries, such as Korea, Brazil, India 
and Mexico, although they are minor suppliers, 
will probably be curtailed. Similarly, future 
access to major markets is likely to become 
increasingly difficult as minimum import 
prices are now being coupled with voluntary 
export restraints. The EEC, for example, has 
recently negotiated restraints with Japan, 
Sweden, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Spain 
and Australia. 
2. Subsidies 
The most disturbing general feature about 
direct government assistance to industry is 
that it appears to be granted on an ad hoc basis 
with little consideration given to economic 
efficiency. Governments may simply wish to 
preserve industries that they judge desirable, 
regardless of economic costs.54 There may be 
special problems, such as regional unemploy-
ment, associated with a scaling down of the 
industry,55 or members of governments may 
simply be responding to political pressure.56 
For developing countries, of principal 
concern is the long-term support given to 
industries where they have a comparative 
advantage at present (or will have in the 
future). In the EEC, for example, there are 
9,500 shoe companies in small towns, support-
ing labour-intensive industries such as tan-
ning. Automatic import licensing was intro-
duced in May 1978 and voluntary export re-
straints have been negotiated. In addition, 
direct subsidy payments are now being paid to 
EEC shoe manufacturers.57-58 Under the tem-
porary Employment Subsidy in the U.K., 
companies receive £ 20 per week (per worker) 
subsidy payable for a maximum of twelve 
months for each job "maintained", and a 
further £ 10 per week (per worker) for the 
ensuing six months should the company face 
further difficulties. To receive the payment it is 
M H . C. Johnson, "Mercantilism: Past, Present, Fu-
ture" , op, cit. 
55A. Krueger, "Effects of Exports from New Industrial 
Countries. . .", op. cit. 
^ T h i s would appear to be of special importance in 
recent years as many governments in OECD countries hold 
rather tenuous majorities. 
5 7Reported in Economist, 4 March 1978. 
^ I t has been estimated that developing countries 
currently have an excess capacity of 100 million pairs of 
shoes per annum, (Financial Times, 20 March 1978). 
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necessary to prove that without a subsidy the 
worker would be redundant. The scheme 
currently covers a quarter of a million workers 
at a cost of a quarter of a billion pounds.59 As 
already mentioned, what is disturbing for the 
developing countries is the fact that over one 
half of the workers are located in the clothing, 
footwear and textile industries. No provision is 
made in such schemes to move labour and 
capital to other sectors.60 An area of less obvi-
ous, but potentially highly important export 
interest to some developing countries is ship-
building —a heavily subsidized industry in 
O E C D countries. A recent report indicates that 
if developing countries are using only half their 
production capacity in 1981-1982, they will 
have 30 per cent of the world market (compared 
with 5-6 per cent today). The report concludes 
that due to lower production costs, their growth 
is "unstoppable".6 1 
Support for industries needing assistance 
in the face of import competition is formalized 
in many national legislatures. There has re-
Perhaps it is most useful to discuss the policy 
implications of the foregoing discussion within 
the context of the immediate, medium- and 
long-term future. 
In the immediate future, it would appear 
that there is a proliferation of trade restrictions 
of the type mentioned above and very little can 
be done about it apart from drawing the 
attention of offenders to the consequences of 
their action.64 
"Crying w o l f does have a role to play if 
the wolf is there, but is kept at bay. OECD-
5 9 The estimates are reported in OECD, Economic 
Surveys: United Kingdom, Paris, March 1978, p . 53. 
^ P e r h a p s it should be mentioned that other special 
employment schemes introduced due to the "severity of 
the post-1974 recession", are the Job Release Scheme, Job 
Creation Programme, Work Experience Programme, 
Communi ty Industry Scheme, Youth Employment 
Subsidy and miscellaneous training schemes. These 
schemes, however, are almost trivial when compared with 
the Temporary Employment Subsidy (OECD, ibid.). 
cently been an enormous increase in requests 
for trade adjustment assistance in many coun-
tries. In the U.S. for example, over the fifteen 
years from 1962-1975 there were 107 success-
ful (i.e., formally approved) requests for assis-
tance with resulting payments affecting 
53,800 workers, and 36 firms. Between April 
1975 and May 1977 there were 690 successful 
petitions affecting 209,100 workers and 78 
firms.62 While such figures would appear 
encouraging to exporters, it should be noted 
that most of the assistance measures serve to 
introduce greater rigidities by subsidizing the 
existing factors and discouraging the shift to 
other sectors. Furthermore, there has been an 
important change in the legislation. Under the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, it was necessary 
to prove that increased imports are "the major 
factor causing or threatening serious injury to 
the firm or its workers". Under the Trade Act 
of 1974 it is sufficient to prove that the "in-
creased imports must be a substantial cause of 
the injury or the threat of such".63 
sponsored declarations on "standstills" appear 
to count for little and any institutional reform 
seems impossible before the completion of the 
current round of MTNs. Such institutional 
reform is necessary since even a "successful" 
completion of the current round of negotiations 
(within the existing structure of institutional 
arrangements) will leave unsolved many of the 
problems addressed above. It would appear 
that the most fundamental problem with 
respect to any "standstill agreement" is that no 
sanctions can be applied to offending parties, 
so pledges count for little. 
6 1 H . P. Drewy, The Emergency of Third World 
Shipbuilding, London, Brook Street, 1978. 
6 2 See H. R. Williams, "U.S. Measures to Relieve Injury 
caused by Import Competition: The Eligibility Test", 
Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 12, N.° 1, January-
February 1978. 
^Ibid. 
^ S e e , for example, GATT, Trade Liberalization..., op. 
cit. 
IV 
Policy implications and conclusions 
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At the moment, countries are protecting 
their domestic markets but are not playing 
according to the rules of the game. It is clear 
that in the medium-term the rules have to be 
changed. The articles of GATT were devised as 
a code of conduct for countries wishing to 
liberalize trade restrictions and it appears they 
are poorly suited to countries' desires for 
increased protection. This is particularly so for 
safeguard action and the use of commercial 
policy for balance-of-payments purposes. In 
the formulation of any new safeguard clause, it 
is important that the true sources of market 
disruption should be identified and due 
consideration be given to disruption in the 
exporting country. In this area it has been 
suggested that developing countries be com-
pensated for such disruption.65 Such issues 
should find a place on the agenda of UNCTAD 
in May 1979, where it would seem reasonable 
for developing countries to ask for some assur-
ance that uncompetitive industries in devel-
oped countries will be phased out, and not 
supported in what appears often to be a vain 
effort to regain international competitiveness. 
It would also seem reasonable that developing 
countries press for their receipt of the often 
substantial rent that is involved in current 
commercial trading transactions. The receipt of 
such rent could be written into the voluntary 
export restrictions that developed countries 
seem to insist on. This is true not only for 
quantitative restrictions on manufactured 
goods, but also for sliding-scale tariffs on 
agricultural products. Developing countries do 
not receive such rent under the current sys-
tems of generalized preferences. It would 
also seem reasonable and appropriate that 
UNCTAD draw attention to the "special and 
differential treatment" promised for develop-
ing countries in the Tokyo Round Declarations. 
^ J . N. Bhagwati, "Market Disruption...", op. cit. 
As tariff preferences for developing countries 
will be further reduced following the current 
round of MTNs, a case could be made for 
developing country exemption from global 
quantitative restrictions. This would seem 
compatible with the developed country accep-
tance of preferential treatment agreed to in 
UNCTAD and restated in the Tokyo Round 
Declaration. 
It is clear that in the longer term there is a 
need for institutional reform in those inter-
national organizations dealing with interna-
tional trade, finance and money, and perhaps 
even the need for the creation of a new world 
trade organization.66 At least some sort of code 
of conduct should be established to facilitate 
the smooth transition of the structural change 
that is associated with the changing compara-
tive advantage of different sectors of different 
countries. Here much of the responsibility 
rests with national governments to pursue 
positive structural adjustment policies and 
refrain from short-sighted "beggar my neigh-
bour" policies. 
Finally, the most important conclusions 
that arises out of the discussion of contempora-
ry protectionist pressure is that the sources are 
outside the control of developing countries. 
Balance-of-payments difficulties, structural 
adjustment problems and mercantilistic 
desires to maintain certain domestic industries 
all lead to domestic policies which developing 
countries cannot directly influence. Further-
more, the nature of much of the contemporary 
protection is such that strong bargaining is 
important in gaining market access. With no 
control over the sources of protectionist 
pressure, and little influence on their share of 
predetermined markets, developing countries 
should be concerned about the state of com-
mercial policy in the world today. 
^Amer ican Institute of International Law, Re-making 
the System of World Trade: A Proposal for Institutional 
Reform, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Mn., 1976. 
